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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUfST 
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543
June 15, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Case held for No. 81-430 - Illinois v. Gates 
No. 82-963 - Massachusetts v. Sheppard 
The question presented in the petition is whether the 
Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence reasonably 
seized in good faith reliance on a search warrant, later 
found defective owing to a technical judicial error. 
After the beaten, burned body of a young woman was 
found in a vacant lot on a Saturday morning, Boston police 
obtained information linking respondent with the crime, and 
interviewed him. On Sunday, police obtained further 
information suggesting respondent committed the murder, and 
decided to obtain a warrant to arrest respondent and to 
search his dwelling. They composed an affidavit setting out 
what the lower courts found to be probable cause to search 
respondent's apartment, and in addition, listed in detail 
property they intended to seize. Because it was Sunday 
afternoon, the police were unable to find a clerk of court, 
or a suitable search warrant form. One of the officers 
found a warrant form used in a neighboring district, once 
used for searches for controlled substances, and marked it 
up for his purposes. He did not, however, change the 
references to "controlled substances" in the portion of the 
form that provided authority to search. 
The officers took the application and affidavit to the 
home of a local judge, who also could not find an 
appropriate search warrant form. He made further changes in 
the "controlled substances" form before signing it, but did 
not alter the portion of the warrant granting authority to 
search for any controlled substance. The warrant made no 
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reference to the officers' affidavit which listed the items 
that the police intended to seize. 
The officers then arrested respondent and searched his 
apartment. They seized a blood-stained pair of boots, 
scrapings of blood stains from the floor, other blood-
stained clothing (both men and women's), and wire, as well 
as a blood-stained earring hidden under the flooring of the 
basement. The trial judge denied respondent's motion to 
suppress this evidence. He held that there was probable 
cause to issue a search warrant, and that, while the warrant 
was defective because it failed to list the items to be 
seized, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of 
the evidence. He found that the police were faced with 
/ circumstances of some exigency and that the officers 
 confined their search "within the limits of the authority 
the police thought reasonably had been granted." Given 
this, the Fourth Amendment did not require . exclusion. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed. It agreed 
with the trial judge that the warrant was defective because 
it failed to particularly describe the things to be seized. 
The court refused to look to the affidavit accompanying the 
warrant for such specification, on the grounds that the 
warrant contained no reference to that document. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court also agreed with the trial judge 
that the items listed in the affidavit could have been 
seized pursuant to a proper warrant and that the police 
officer's search did not go beyond what a proper warrant 
would authorize: "the search was conducted in the same way 
and with the same results as it would have been conducted if 
the warrant had not been defective." The court nonetheless 
concluded on the basis of existing Supreme Court precedent 
that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the 
evidence. The Court explicitly declined to ground 
suppression on state law. In its petition, the State argues 
only that the judicially created exclusionary rule should be 
modified. 
The result below may well be inconsistent with this 
Court's statements that warrants are not to be interpreted 
"hypertechnically," United States v. Ventresca, 380 u.s. 102 
(1965), but the State has not challenged the lower courts' 
holding that the Fourth Amendment was violated. The 
reasonable good faith exception ·issue may present 
difficulties similar to those encountered in Gates, because 
the conduct at issue is that of the issuing magistrate. I 
- 3 -
would hold this case for Colorado v. Quintero, No. 82-ll7l, 
or Michigan v. Clifford, 82-357. 
Sincerely, 
